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Abstract
Moderate minimum wages increases are known to be neutral to em-
ployment and beneficial for lower tail wage inequality. Spillover-effects are
commonly found, but fade out in the upper tail of the wage distribution.
This paper investigates the Belgian case, in which minimum wages are
indexed and sector specific wage scales institutionalize wage inequality
over the full distribution. We find that the national minimum wage has a
reducing effect on lower tail wage inequality that is suppressed by sectoral
minimum wages. Sectoral minimum wages, however, have a compressing
effect on both sides of the wage distribution, in part through the reduction
of turnover and exclusion of entrants. While observed wage inequality is
stable in the period 1996-2006, controlling for minimum wages reveals a
latent growth in upper tail wage inequality.
1 Introduction
Institutions arise whenever society tries to get a hold on the economy. They
are often the result of a political process in which the bargaining power of
interest groups is decisive. Therefore, from an economic point of view, it is
difficult to link them to either the creation of or the solution for market failures.
Institutions have long histories, which may prove their functionality, but, as
evolutionary economists and political scientist have drawn attention to, also
cause cause path dependencies, meaning traces are left of a system that is no
∗This research originates from a 2008-2009 project on wage bargaining, supported by the
Ministry of Labour. I am also grateful for the support of the HR service provider Acerta for
access to the database of negotiated pay levels.
†Correspondence: sem.vandekerckhove@kuleuven.be
1
longer functional (Page, 2006). In the present study, labour market institutions
– the minimum wage, bargaining level and wage indexation – are called upon
to explain wage inequality as exogenous factors. The Belgian case provides
a particularly interesting perspective, as a stronghold of long standing labour
market institutions in an era of European harmonization towards deregulation,
as will be shown next.
The primary institutional dimension is arguably the level on which decision
are made. The literature on the optimal level of wage bargaining follows an
influential article by Calmfors and Driffill (1988). They suggest that two opti-
mal bargaining levels exist. The first is the company level, since the bargaining
power of trade unions is low because of market competition. The other optimum
is entirely centralized wage bargaining. In this case, trade unions take macro-
economic implications of wage setting into account. In contrast, industries with
intermediate-level negotiations, are though of as free-riding economic agents.
Higher wages in one sector ceteris paribus would lead to higher prices, and
therefore lower purchasing power for every other sector’s employees, unless they
demand higher wages. The outcome of this process is inflation or unemploy-
ment, and at worst, both (‘misery’). The decline of trade union membership
in Europe, the disintegration of wage bargaining systems in Nordic countries
(Sweden and Denmark, known for it’s flexicurity policy) and Germany (mini-
jobs with no minimum wage), as well as a close interest in wage setting from the
European Commission and the European Central bank in recent times, implies
wage bargaining is moving in both directions preferred by the theory. Despite
the popularity of this view in macroeconomics (e.g. Peersman & Van Robays,
2009), John Driffill (2006), reviewing the literature, notes that the one predic-
tion that is consistently found is that highly centralized or highly coordinated
bargaining is superior to intermediate or lower level bargaining. Whether there
is a hump or linear effect is still subject of much debate. It will amongst other
factors depend on the openness or international integration of the economy, de-
termining the price setting power of industries and thus ending the free ride
(Danthine & Hunt, 1994).
The implicit message of the optimal bargaining literature is that trade unions
will set wages favourable to their insiders when they can and on whatever possi-
ble scale (Lindbeck & Snower, 1986). We can equate such agreements to politi-
cally imposed minimum wages, and refer to the literature on this topic (Garnero,
Kampelmann, & Rycx, 2013). Contrary to intuition and much of the political
debate, there is a general consensus that moderate increases in minimum wages
do not affect employment (Eccles & Freeman, 1982; Schmitt, 2013). A number
of studies even suggest small positive effects, for example because of an upward
sloping labour supply curve (Katz & Krueger, 1992), long run endogeneity of
technology (Chennells & Reenen, 1997), or demand-led regimes (Stockhammer,
Onaran, & Ederer, 2009). In contrast, the employment of very young employees
is found to be negatively correlated with minimum wages (Brown, 1999).
There is also a second effect of minimum wage rises. For obvious reasons, a
rise of the minimum wage reduces lower tail wage inequality (DiNardo, Fortin,
& Lemieux, 1996). However, as a corollary, other wages may also increase, for
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instance in order to preserve wage differences for reasons of equity. Such effects
are termed spillovers (Brown, 1999; Teulings, 2003). The suppressing effect of
minimum wages on wage inequality has been studied to reveal underlying wage
inequality in the US (DiNardo et al., 1996; Lee, 1999) and this will be our
approach too. Self-evidently, minimum wages are only part of the story. Other
factors such as education levels, experience or age (Katz & Murphy, 1992),
and technological change (Autor, Levy, & Murnane, 2003; Goos, Manning, &
Salomons, 2012) have been studied in this respect as well. We do point at the
particular importance of minimum wages as they delineate the space for these
other factors to have effect.
Indexation may have a separate effect on the wage distribution from real
wage increases. First of all, wage indexation, if generalized, affects the full
wage distribution. It effectively increases labour costs in a linear way relative
to other economies. This may cause divergence within a currency union, if
the other economies behave differently – which certainly can be said of today’s
Eurozone. The ECB therefore funded a large research program called the Wage
Dynamics Network (Babecky et al., 2009; ECB, 2009; Du Caju, Fuss, & Wintr,
2007). The project paid ample attention to downward real and nominal wage
rigidity, which trouble monetary policy. Wage indexation, by definition, implies
perfect real wage rigidity. It does not, however, imply downward nominal wage
rigidity.
Decisions on the level of wage bargaining, minimum wages and wage index-
ation are central institutional factors determining wage setting. In a way, from
the conventional point of view, Belgium would be the worst practice example.
For the evaluation of the dynamics described above, however, it provides appro-
priate variation. We will present the Belgian wage setting system briefly and
address the institutional characteristics discussed above.
The structure of wage bargaining in Belgium is three layered. Every two
years since 1996, representatives of workers’ and employers’ organizations gather
in a central body to decide on a ceiling for (real) wage raises. This single
figure is based on the predicted wage growth of the main trading partners:
France, Germany and The Netherlands. Unless enforced by the government,
this so called wage norm is non-binding. Also at the centralized level, in the
National Labour Council, the minimum wage is determined. Since 1994, the
national minimum wage follows the moving average of the health index – a price
index without fossil fuel, tobacco and alcoholic beverages prices. It is raised
whenever this index is 2% above the previous level. Within this framework (a
minimum wage and a maximum wage growth), the employer’s organizations and
trade unions may freely set wages. In practice, nearly all sectors apply some
form of wage indexation and most have sector specific wage scales above the
minimum wage. In a limited number of sectors, and mostly in large companies,
company agreements are settled in addition to the higher level agreements.
Finally, individual level wage negotiation allows for bonuses or rewards for top
earners, but this is uncommon by design.
How are we to interpret this setting? First, with a national minimum wage
and a limit for wage growth, the central level sets out brackets between which
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sectors are free to negotiate. At least before the current monetary crisis, the span
has been wide enough so we can maintain that wage bargaining in Belgium, as in
Calmfors and Driffill (1988), caries most of the weight at the intermediate level.
As we have already mentioned, this is considered to be suboptimal position.
Second, having wage indexation of the minimum wage as well as in nearly all
sectors, there is perfect downward real wage rigidity. There is growing national
and international pressure (e.g. IMF, 2013) on the government to intervene in
the wage setting and reform the indexation mechanism. Third, sectors develop
wage scales, which are occupation specific minimum wages. Raises to these
sector minimum wages may be absolute or relative. When based on indexation,
they are always relative, but real wage increases may be absolute. Also, it is
possible that negotiated wage raises are only applied to the minima, and not to
individual premiums. As a rule, however, a shift in the sector minimum wage
implies a similar shift of all wages. They thus institutionalize wage differentials
and preserve wage inequality. Spillover effects arise at all times, not only when
an adjustment is strictly necessary from an equilibrium point of view.
The aim of this paper is to disentangle the effects of national minimum
wages and sectoral minimum wages, the ‘competing minima’. The main hy-
pothesis is that sectoral minimum wages, because of the wage scale they are
part of, preserve wage inequalities. National minimum wages however have a
separate effect: they push wages in sectors with low wages and without extensive
wage scales, and foster minimal spillovers. The unconditional effect of minimum
wages is presumed to be smaller than commonly found, because indirectly, sec-
tor minimum wages take over the national minima. In short, the outcome of
a heavily institutionalized wage setting system paradoxically is more, not less
inequality. Also, because of rising wages and fewer compensation options, nega-
tive employment effects are still dreaded. We may therefore end up with stable
or rising inequality and less employment as a structural characteristic of the
wage bargaining model.
Our findings indicate that this paradoxical scenario does not play out. In
fact, sectoral minimum wages compress the wage distribution on either side of
the median. They do obscure the real effect of national minimum wages. Also,
there is no net disemployment effect. On the contrary: sectoral minimum wages
decrease wage inequality through lower turnover. However, at the same time
there are less entrants causing inequality.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in section 2 we discuss and explore
the data with some descriptive statistics, in section 3 we elaborate on the model
and present the results. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Wage inequality in Belgium between 1996 and
2006
2.1 Data
The wage data come from the state social security administration (RSZ-ONSS).
It is the gross wage employers have to register, so that social security benefits
can be derived from it. The wage variable includes regular premiums, such
as a permanent wage raise and task compensation (e.g. for shift work, heavy
work, night work, extra hours etc.), and part of the holiday allowance for some
employees. In order to equalize the concept, we divide the observed wage by 1.08
for employees for which the holiday allowance was included in the wage variable
– this allowance is set at about 8% of the base wage. The sample amounts to
one third of the employees working in the private sector between 1996 and 2006.
This allows a sector approach in nearly all major industries. Besides wages and
labour volume, there is little additional worker information available. There is
an indicator for company size, as well as gender and age variables. Importantly,
we keep only employees aged 21 to 65. The legal retirement age is 65 and below
21 years old, subminimum wages and special statutes exist which cannot easily
be traced.
Despite coming from an administrative source, the data had to be thoroughly
cleaned. First of all, the wage negotiations take place in joint committees which
only loosely collide with industrial classifications such as NACE. Most impor-
tantly, there are separate joint committees for white and blue collar workers
in most industries. Note that we will further use sectors and joint committees
interchangeably. Data from 1996 to 2002 do not have a reliable indicator of
the joint committee. Therefore an algorithm was used to reconstruct the joint
committee based on probabilities using available data and other indicators (i.e.
the NACE-code, white- or blue collar employment, and an administrative key
variable for employer’s collective funds). This was successful in smoothing the
employment evolution of sectors, which serves as a visual proof of the effec-
tiveness (appendix, figure 3 to 5). Second, the administrative data have many
special categories for workers for which exceptions in labour regulation exist
(apprentices, protected occupations such as miners and messengers, etc.). We
excluded these categories from the data if possible. Third, the yearly wage
should be related to the yearly labour volume in order to obtain a full time
equivalent wage. Even though the wage data is accurate, the labour volume is
not. To alleviate the possible bias, we truncated the labour volume at 150% of
a full time job, and kept only employees working at least 50% of the year (being
50% all year or 100% during half of the year). Also, we only kept the job in
which the employee worked the longest period of time.
The choices made for the data cleaning result in a loss of half of the original
sample, so that the sample is about 1/6-th of the total population working in the
private sector. On the bright side, every restriction applied should normalize
the final sample observations, so that systematic biases are avoided as much as
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Table 1: Descriptives statistics for the sample of joint committees (1996, 2006)
Sector n ’96 n ’06 µ(w) ’96 µ(w) ’06 σ(w) ’96 σ(w) ’06
109 5 472 2 918 9.50 9.80 0.15 0.19
110 2 070 1 886 9.48 9.72 0.14 0.16
112 7 112 7 627 9.74 10.02 0.19 0.21
115 3 067 2 211 9.91 10.13 0.23 0.25
116 15 571 14 649 9.97 10.22 0.29 0.32
118 17 032 17 160 9.76 10.01 0.21 0.21
119 8 353 9 045 9.65 9.89 0.17 0.18
120 10 396 7 319 9.69 9.97 0.20 0.20
121 6 190 8 099 9.61 9.87 0.17 0.19
124 40 395 43 862 9.75 10.01 0.20 0.20
126 6 887 5 667 9.72 9.95 0.15 0.17
130 5 228 3 854 9.90 10.18 0.27 0.25
136 2 372 2 355 9.81 10.08 0.22 0.24
140 15 757 21 634 9.75 9.87 0.23 0.22
145 2 355 3 166 9.55 9.77 0.17 0.19
149 11 587 13 803 9.74 10.01 0.19 0.21
201 15 927 19 507 9.40 9.70 0.27 0.27
202 12 566 13 786 9.56 9.87 0.30 0.28
207 20 024 24 208 10.17 10.45 0.46 0.44
209 21 974 22 340 10.12 10.36 0.40 0.39
211 1 690 1 823 10.40 10.73 0.46 0.47
214 3 055 1 912 9.97 10.27 0.36 0.39
215 1 533 1 885 9.84 10.18 0.42 0.43
218 93 414 122 387 9.91 10.19 0.45 0.44
220 7 108 7 968 10.06 10.32 0.44 0.43
302 13 513 18 587 9.57 9.82 0.24 0.23
306 8 621 8 230 10.10 10.33 0.41 0.42
307 2 759 3 189 9.73 10.05 0.41 0.39
308 1 705 1 456 9.98 10.24 0.38 0.42
310 19 197 21 340 10.12 10.43 0.36 0.38
311 5 678 10 550 9.59 9.80 0.33 0.31
312 1 372 3 603 9.71 9.99 0.28 0.29
313 2 521 3 203 9.73 10.02 0.34 0.36
321 1 062 898 9.73 9.98 0.31 0.30
Selection 393 563 452 127 9.84 10.10 0.39 0.40
Total 602 684 693 555 9.86 10.10 0.38 0.38
Source: RSZ-ONSS
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possible. Still, anomalies will exist, such as in similar research, where minimum
wages are higher than the lower limits of the wage distribution.
The minimum wage data come from three sources. National minimum wages
were provided by the National Labour Council and are publicly available (upon
request). Sectoral minimum wages were collected by us from 600 sector agree-
ments for 34 of the largest joint committees using the sector wage scale database
of the HR service provider Acerta, who gives legal advice on payroll adminis-
tration. The available information only stretches back to 2000 for most joint
committees. Data for 1996 to 1999 were completed applying the index of negoti-
ated pay raises (ICL) provided by the Ministry of Labour and publicly available
upon request. Our approach however was different from the ICL in following the
evolution of the lowest wage scale in a joint committee, looking only at the base
wage and following current pay levels. The ICL follows the average pay scale
increases, based on just one base level. Contrasting the indicators for the years
in which both are available we find a surprisingly low correlation of r = .49.
Upon closer inspection, it seems this the difference is mainly caused by one-off
increases of the minimum wage scale only. Since we do not want to rule out
such pay increases by design, we prefer keeping with the minimum wage when
available, and accept the more smoothed ICL (applied to the earliest known
pay level) for the years in which actualized minimum wages are not available.
Finally, minimum wages change at different moments of the year, so there is
a need to translate this into yearly figures. For the national and the sectoral
minimum wage, we computed the yearly aggregates by taking a weighted av-
erage of the minimum wages that were in place during the year. This is the
objective minimum for a worker who was employed in the sector all year. Yet
there may be some misalignment with the yearly wage for workers that do not
have a labour volume of 100% (full time, all year), since we do not know in
which months they were employed.
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the 34 joint committees in the
sample. The total count ranges from 393 563 employees in 1996 to 452 127 in
2006. This amounts to 65% of the working population. Mean log wages range
from 9.70 in joint committee 201 (independent stores) to 10.73 in joint com-
mittee 211 (petrol industry) in 2006. The smallest wages dispersion (standard
deviation) is .16 in joint committee 110 (textile cleaning), the largest is .47,
again in joint committee 211. Means and standard deviations are comparable
in the selection and the total sample. The labels for the joint committees are
added in appendix, table 9.
2.2 Descriptive analysis
Income inequality in high income countries is on the rise. According to the
OECD (2011), there has been an average annual increase in income of 1.3% for
the bottom decile and 1.9% for the top decile between the mid 1980s and the late
2000s. In Belgium, however, this has not been the case. The average increase for
the bottom decile is 1.7%, while the top decile has been gaining 1.2% annually
and total population faced an increase of 1.1%. Of all 27 OECD countries, only
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of the log wage distribution, 1996-2006
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Greece and Turkey had a stronger decline in income inequality. France and
Hungary have small declines too. How does this translate into wages? We first
look at the shape of the log wage distribution. Figure 1 shows kernel density
estimates for 1996 and 2006 in 2006 prices. The vertical line shows the national
minimum wage, which remained practically unchanged in this period in real
terms. It is clear that the distribution for the full sample and the selected
sectors has shifted to the right, but no substantial change in inequality strikes
the eye. When we split up the full sample by gender, we do see remarkable
differences: the minimum wage seems to have been quite binding for women in
1996 and the shape of the female wage distribution has changed – became more
normal – in the 11-year interval.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of minimum wages and wage inequality in the
same period for the selected sectors split up by median wage tertiles. In the
upper left graph we see the level and the evolution of minimum wages in prices
of 2006. The solid line shows the national minimum wage, which has a slightly
negative slope since the consumer price index grew faster than the health index
used for indexing the minimum wage. Remarkably, the minimum pay level in
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Figure 2: Evolution of the 20-80 log wage differential by pay level, 1996-2006
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the mid pay sectors is higher and grew faster than the minimum pay level in the
low pay sectors. This indicates the higher share of company level negotiations
in the high pay sectors, de facto replacing sector level agreements. The upper
right graph shows the evolution of overall wage inequality (20-80 differential).
A zero score means the 20th percentile value equals the 80th percentile value, so
scores approaching zero imply less inequality. The mid paying joint committees
have a lower inequality than the low paying joint committees, which makes sense
from their position in the middle of the overall wage distribution. High paying
joint committees still have a far higher wage inequality. In the high paying
joint committees, we see almost no trend, while the mid and low paying joint
committees have see a slow trend toward more equality. This may point to
minimum wage effects, which do not influence the high paying joint committees
to the same extent as the low and mid paying joint committees. The bottom
graphs show the lower tail wage inequality (on the left) and the upper tail wage
inequality (on the right hand side). High pay sectors have most inequality on
both ends of the distribution, causing most over the overall inequality. The
mid pay sectors have the lowest inequality on both ends, while the low pay are
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in-between.
In sum, from the visual analysis, no immediate linear relation between ei-
ther pay levels or sectoral minimum wages and inequality can be derived. Low
sectoral minimum wages go together with high and low inequality, while low in-
equality goes together with low and intermediate pay levels, and with high and
low sectoral minimum wages. These puzzling descriptive statistics are actually
beneficial for the identification of the analysis we introduce next.
3 Analysis
3.1 Model
We first present the Mincer equation (1) as a mere starting point. The log
wage wit for the worker i at time t is a function of a quadratic in experience
(EXP ) and a set of vectors Z denoting background variables such as gender,
experience, company size, educational attainment, ability, race, et cetera. As
mentioned above, we do not have many such variables. We can use age as a
proxy for experience. This is of particular importance for the wage distribu-
tion in Belgium, as seniority wage levels are also institutionalized in all of the
white collar joint committees and to a lesser extent in some blue collar joint
committees.
wit = αt + β1EXPit + β2EXP
2
it + γZ + εit (1)
In an attempt to explain wage inequality, minimum wages can enter this
model at the individual level in a quantile regression, from which the impact on
different percentiles can be measured. Alternatively, we may assume the latent
wage distribution has the same shape in different sectors, and do the analysis
at this level using variation created over sectors. The latent distribution is the
distribution that would exist in the absence of minimum wages. This approach
is suggested by Lee (1999). We rephrase the assumption in appendix 5.1. If
valid, we can test the minimum wage effect using specification (2), in which
the subscript s denotes a variable at the sector level, wp,st − w50,st is the wage
dispersion between the pth percentile and the sector’s median wage, and wnmw,t
is the national minimum wage in year t. Because the national minimum wage
is not presumed to influence the shape of the wage distribution in a sector with
high wage levels, we adjust the minimum wage by subtracting the log median
wage. Because the difference of logs is the log of a ratio, we call this the relative
minimum wage. It is also referred to as a Kaitz-index (Rycx & Kampelmann,
2012). The relative minimum wage will be low in a sector with high wages, and
high when wage levels are low. In the latter case, we expect to find an effect on
the wage distribution. This cross-sectional finding is the actual minimum wage
effect with year dummies αt in place and when the identifying assumption is
met. If not, the simultaneity of w50,st in both the regressand and the regressor
may bias results. In fact, measurement error (noise) will always cause a bias. For
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this reason, we will not actually use the median, but the trimmed mean of the
wage distribution between the 30-th and the 70-th percentile. Autor, Manning,
and Smith (2010) suggest a 2SLS instrumentation of the median wage. As in
Lee (1999), we also include the quadratic form. A negative effect of the square
implies spillover effects on the full distribution, so that large minimum wage
increases do not linearly decrease wage inequality.
wp,st − w50,st =αt + β1(wnmw,t − w50,st)
+ β2(wnmw,t − w50,st)2 + εst (2)
The effects of minimum wages can be threefold. First, there is the so called
mechanical effect: when the minimum wage goes up, wages that used to be
lower now have to match the new minimum. This causes spikes at the min-
imum wage. Second, there is a spillover effect: when minimum wages go up,
there is a tendency for (parts of) the distribution to shift to the right, because
people deem wage differentials just. We will therefore notice humps on the
wage distribution. Third, there may occur truncation of the wage distribution
because of the disemployment effect of minimum wage rises. It is clear that
mechanical effects compress lower tail wage inequality. Spillovers compress the
inequality for higher percentiles, until they also reach the median. Disemploy-
ment, finally, also lowers wage inequality. As the low paid workers are dismissed
the 10-th percentile value moves up – as does the 50-th percentile. In absence
of any other effect on the distribution, this causes the new 10-50 wage differ-
ential to fall around the former median pay, where the density is higher. As a
result, inequality decreases. The total effect of changes in minimum pay lev-
els therefore depends on the simultaneous effect on different percentiles and on
disemployment effects.
Using sectors as source of variation is both a bless and a curse. In the spirit
of Lee’s paper, it is perhaps more likely that states represent samples of the
union as a whole, rather than sectors representing samples of an economy. So
two US states should, at least in their latent wage distribution, be more similar
than two Belgian sectors. Yet this may not be as clear as it seems: the US in
fact is well known for industrial centralization and a high interstate wage differ-
ential. Moreover, in Europe, the differences between average wages in different
countries are larger than between different sectors in one country, as are the
institutional differences (see Nickell, Nunziata, & Ochel, 2005; Garnero et al.,
2013). To exploit this intra-European variation is a conceptual and methodolog-
ical challenge. A second argument supporting the use of inter-industry variation
is that even regional minimum wages in Belgium are decided within (very few)
sectors. It is thus natural to study wage inequalities at the same level where
wages are set. A third reason – and we fully acknowledge this only counts within
white or blue collar groups of joint committees – sectors span a wide range of
occupations with an equally wide variety of skill requirements. Therefore, we
can expect the bias from using sectors as units of analysis to be not far off from
using regional variation – if ever the United States of Belgium had more than
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three regions.
There is no strict test for the validity of the identifying assumption, i.c. the
absence of correlation between pay levels and the shape of the latent wage dis-
tribution. Lee checks the correlation of pay levels with upper tail inequality,
but our hypothesis is that minimum wages in Belgium affect the full distribu-
tion through the wage scales. As an indication, we have calculated the wage
differentials between neighbouring deciles and test the correlation between these
inequalities which represent the shape of small parts of the wage distribution.
We note reasonably high correlations from -.47 for the 80-90 differential to -.85
for the 20-30 differential. Most importantly, the correlation is steadily weak-
ening above the 60th percentile, so we can imagine that if we had a view on
wages in a space unaffected by minimum wages, the distribution would not be
correlated with pay levels.
In order to test for the suppressing effect of sectoral minimum wages, we
integrate them into equation (2). There is no need to express the sector-specific
minimum wages wmin,st relative to the sectoral wage distribution, because it
is already variable over sectors and time and placed within the sector’s wage
distribution1. The extended, sector-specific Lee equation then becomes (3).
wp10,st − wp50,st =αt + β1(wnmw,t − w50,it) + β2(wnmw,t − w50,it)2 (3)
+ γ1wsmw,st + γ2w
2
smw,st + δT + κE + λX + εst (4)
Minimum wage estimators may be affected by the ommission of employment
variables, as explained above. For this, the final model controls for the rate of
turnover and entrants. The turnover measure is the share of workers, by sector,
that are no longer employed in the sector in the next year (t+1). The entrants
measure is the share of workers in a sector that were not employed in that sector
in t− 1. In order not to lose the last year for the former measure, and the first
year for the latter, those values were imputed applying the geometric average
growth to the year before and after the missing value. Finally, the set of control
variables X includes feminisation (for the pooled sample), the 30-th and 70-th
percentile value of the age distribution, and the share of small (less than 50
employees) and large (500 and more) companies.
The estimation method of choice is OLS. The panel structure of the data
would suggest a within-transformation might be more appropriate. There are
some objections to this natural suggestion. A panel model revises the identifying
assumption: within state wage levels should be unrelated to the latent wage
dispersion, after controlling for intersectoral year effects. But this contaminates
the effect of yearly varying relative minimum wages. Moreover, there is more
variance in the relative minimum wage cross-sectionally, than in the minimum
wage over time.
1We nevertheless explore the option, as it has the advantage of equalizing minimum wage
measurement scales.
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3.2 Findings
In the simple Lee model for the pooled sample (table 2), the effect of minimum
wages on the lower tail wage inequality is just slightly lower than the US results
and significant in all percentiles. The quadratic effect however is absent. For the
lower tail (10-50) wage inequality, a 10 percent increase in the relative minimum
wage relates to a 3.83% compression of wage inequality. There is a subtle rise
in lower tail (10-50) wage inequality over time, regardless of minimum wages.
Remarkably, effects are symmetric around the median. In the upper tail (90-50),
the sign is negative, meaning that higher relative minimum wages compresses
the wage distribution. The explaining power on the lower tail wage differentials
(R2 = 65%) is much higher than on the upper tail (R2 = 29%).
Table 2: Minimum wage effects on log wage differentials – model 1: regression
coefficients and significance levels (pooled sample)
10-50 30-50 70-50 90-50
(base) 2000 -0.164 *** -0.049 *** 0.082 *** 0.261 ***
1996 -0.009 -0.010 0.002 0.005
1997 -0.015 -0.014 0.004 0.010
1998 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001
1999 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.005
2001 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.004
2002 0.020 0.005 -0.006 -0.009
2003 0.037 * 0.011 -0.008 -0.015
2004 0.043 * 0.013 -0.011 -0.022
2005 0.040 * 0.011 -0.011 -0.021
2006 0.034 * 0.011 -0.013 -0.024
NMW 0.383 *** 0.187 *** -0.119 ** -0.217 *
NMW2 -0.032 0.025 0.042 0.155
R2 65% 49% 34% 29%
Pooled OLS estimates. Flags: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Adding sector minimum wages (table 3) alters the effects in an interesting
way: the effect of relative minimum wages becomes markedly stronger in the
lower tail, also bringing with it some unexpected quadratic effects in the upper
tail. More importantly, the effects of sector minimum wages improves the fit of
the model for the upper tail by a substantial factor, suggesting the compression
on the right hand side of the wage distribution follows wage scale increases.
Also, while lower tail wage inequality is stable over time, we find that latent
inequality in the upper tail is rising consistently.
In the last two columns, we enter some control variables that may influence
wage dispersion. We find very weak age effects and a weak but significant effect
of employment. Gender-wise, the share of women in the sector mainly encom-
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passes a rise in the upper tail wage inequality. The share of small companies
accounts for a rise in lower tail wage inequality, while the share of large com-
panies compresses upper tail inequality significantly. The effects of turnover
and entrants are significant for the lower tail and rather revealing: the effect of
sector minimum wages is partly mediated by these movements. As the effect of
turnover is negative, a rise in sector minimum wages translates into less wage in-
equality because it prevents turnover. Further, the effect of entrants is negative
as well, so a rise in sector minimum wages means less workers are hired.
Table 3: Minimum wage effects on log wage differentials – model 2: regression
coefficients and significance levels (pooled sample)
10-50 90-50 10-50 90-50
(base) 2000 -62.721 *** 42.914 * -46.228 *** 33.708 **
1996 0.035 * -0.067 ** 0.022 _ -0.029 _
1997 0.018 -0.044 _ 0.003 -0.012
1998 0.030 * -0.040 _ 0.020 _ -0.017
1999 0.011 -0.022 0.007 -0.008
2001 -0.009 0.019 -0.010 0.005
2002 -0.007 0.043 _ -0.008 0.016
2003 0.002 0.053 * -0.005 0.021
2004 0.000 0.064 ** -0.007 0.023
2005 -0.011 0.083 *** -0.020 0.037 *
2006 -0.023 _ 0.098 *** -0.021 _ 0.035 *
NMW 0.536 *** -0.366 *** 0.648 *** -0.888 ***
NMW2 0.050 0.178 * 0.091 _ -0.238 ***
SMW 12.531 *** -8.011 * 9.202 *** -6.509 **
SMW2 -0.626 *** 0.371 * -0.459 *** 0.313 *
Employment -0.008 *** 0.008 ***
Turnover -0.032 * 0.024
Entrants -0.044 ** 0.007
Small Comp. -0.058 ** 0.007
Large Comp. -0.027 -0.088 ***
Agep30 -0.001 -0.001
Agep70 0.006 * -0.003
Women -0.078 *** 0.410 ***
R2 79% 65% 84% 86%
Pooled OLS estimates. Flags: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Using an alternative measure of sector minimum wages similar to the relative
national minimum wage (model 3, appendix table 4), the effects of the national
minimum wage in the lower tail vanish. In the upper tail, a rising national
minimum wage causes a rise in inequality – an unlikely spillover in the absence
of lower tail effects. This is somehow corrected in the regression with controls
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for employment and employee characteristics, but altogether, the alternative
measure does not deliver.
Results by gender (appendix, table 5 to 8) confirm the findings from the
pooled sample with some particularities. The national minimum wage effects
are weaker for both groups. Men have a significant effect of turnover, while
women have a significant effect of entrants. So the protection of insiders seems
to benefit men and keep out female entrants.
4 Conclusion
Wage bargaining in Belgium has a rare configuration. It features a high degree
of organization of employers’ and employees’ organizations (with rising mem-
bership), and an almost complete coverage with legal extension of agreements
on the one hand, and intermediate level negotiations, so an average degree of
co-ordination, on the other hand. In a unifying Europe, it is sailing it’s own
course. Yet, contrary to most other OECD countries, in the last two decades
it did not have growing wage inequality or unemployment crises. This justifies
a look into the dynamics of the labour market institutions, in particular the
minimum wage.
We distinguished national and sectoral minimum wages. The main hypoth-
esis is that sectoral minimum wages in fact evolve at the same pace as all
occupation specific minimum wages in the sector, and therefore preserve wage
inequality. When a rise of the minimum wage takes place, one spillover will
actually cause the full distribution to shift to the right and little inequality
changes are expected. The model gave partial support to this thesis.
In fact, national minimum wages did have an effect on the wage distribution,
mostly on the lower tail. However, this effect increased when sector minimum
wages were introduced in the model, indicating the wage scale shift did hap-
pen. But remarkably, changes in the sectoral minimum wage correlate with less
inequality, both in the lower and the upper tail, where wage compression was
deemed impossible. The growing effect of year dummies indicates that the min-
imum wages actually suppressed a rise in upper tail wage inequality. Moreover,
using additional controls on employment, we found that higher turnover implies
more lower tail inequality, taking away part of the effect of sector minimum
wages. This implies minimum wages correlate with low turnover rates. On the
other hand, a high share of entrants is also negatively correlated with lower
tail inequality, so at the same time entrance is limited because of rising sec-
toral minimum wages. We thus find that the Belgium wage bargaining does not
cause a paradox of ‘controlled misery’, but instead equalizes wages and protects
insiders.
Several notes are in place. First, the Lee model we extended rests on the
strong assumption that latent wage distribution in all sectors is the same. We
cannot test this, because no part of the latent wage distribution can be observed
if our hypothesis is true. Second, we don’t know why there is wage compression
and no increase in upper tail wage inequality. The minimum wage seems to
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have a gravity-like effect. It may be that the wage norm – the upper limit for
wage negotiations – that was implemented in 1996 has a strong effect on wage
formation. There is no earlier data to make the comparison. In absence of
such a wage norm-effect, it is also possible that the degree of organization of
the negotiating partners ensures that macroeconomic balances are maintained.
Finally, this may all occur in an open economy as long as geographical labour
mobility is low and employees are not prepared to move to countries with, for
instance, higher returns to skills. The same can be said of internal job flows
between sectors.
Wage setting institutions shape the context of wage setting itself, putting
limits on possible wage inequality so that the latent distribution is not expressed.
We have found that such strong effects exist in Belgium, despite a mechanism
that institutionalize wage differentials. Contrary to expectations, this system
proved to be neutral on employed, yet serving the insiders in the labour market.
For policy, this makes an interesting case for a deviant member state in the
European Union. Future research should focus on the effects of institutional
differences and the (in)compatibility within a monetary union when faced with
adverse economic shocks.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Identifying assumption for the Lee model
We reconstruct Lee’s identifying assumption, in this case for sectors instead
of states. Essentially, there there should exist, in every year, a latent wage
distribution, characterized by the cumulative distribution function Ft, which is
the same for all sectors. Through this function, every standardized wage zst is
appointed a percentile, as in equation (5).
q = Ft(zst) (5)
q = Ft(
wst − µst
σst
) (6)
The result of this function is a quantile q, denoting the relative frequency of
wages below wst. Inverting the cumulative distribution function in (7) to (9),
we obtain the latent quantile value, say w∗p for the pth percentile, where the
asterisk denotes the latent character. This means for every sector, the shape
of the latent wage distribution is the same, and one can find the wage for any
percentile using just the mean and standard deviation – which may both vary
over sectors – as parameters of the distribution.
zst,q = F
−1
t (q) (7)
w∗q − µst
σst
= F−1t (q) (8)
w∗q = µst + σstF
−1
t (q) (9)
From this, we find that w∗q−µjs = σjsF−1t (q), which allows us to express the
covariance with the relative minimum wage of each side, conditional on time,
as:
Cov(w∗q − µst, wmin,t − wp50,jt|t)
= Cov(σstF
1
t (q), wmin,t − wp50,jt|t) = 0 (10)
The covariances are indeed zero on some conditions for this assumption to be
true:
– wp50,st = µst, or Ft(p50) = 0, which is the case in a normal distribution
and other symmetric distributions;
– The average standard deviation E(σst|t) is normalized to constant (say
1) over time. This is easily done by defining w′st =
wst
σ¯t
. This is only
necessary for clarity of the argument.
From (10) and given the above, the zero covariance is true whenever
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Cov(F 1t (q), wp50,st|t) = 0,
since wmin,t is a constant conditional on time. This means the distribution
function, or the shape of the latent distribution (i.e. the log wage differentials),
should be unrelated to the pay level, i.c. the observed median. When this is true,
the covariance between the relative minimum wage and the latent distribution
is automatically also zero. As a consequence, when the covariance between the
relative minimum wage and the observed distribution is non-zero, the change in
the distribution is due to the minimum wage (not to pay levels).
5.2 Figures and tables
Table 4: Minimum wage effects on log wage differentials – model 3: regression
coefficients and significance levels (pooled sample)
10-50 90-50 10-50 90-50
(base) 2000 -0.184 *** 0.309 *** -0.187 ** 0.124
1996 0.002 -0.017 -0.002 0.001
1997 -0.008 -0.004 -0.017 0.011
1998 0.013 -0.014 0.008 -0.002
1999 0.001 -0.007 -0.001 0.001
2001 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.007
2002 0.016 0.000 0.009 -0.008
2003 0.030 * -0.001 0.016 -0.008
2004 0.033 * -0.002 0.019 -0.012
2005 0.029 * 0.001 0.012 -0.007
2006 0.022 0.002 0.014 -0.016
NMW -0.004 0.552 *** 0.191 ** -0.371 ***
NMW2 -0.152 ** 0.320 *** -0.089 _ -0.138 *
SMW’ 0.520 *** -0.934 *** 0.448 *** -0.493 ***
SMW’2 0.272 *** -0.242 * 0.277 *** -0.115
Employment -0.009 *** 0.009 ***
Turnover -0.032 * 0.025
Entrants -0.050 *** 0.010
Small Comp. -0.059 ** 0.010
Large Comp. -0.028 -0.086 ***
Age-p30 0.002 -0.002
Age-p70 0.004 -0.002
Women -0.070 *** 0.407 ***
R2 79% 65% 84% 86%
Pooled OLS estimates. Flags: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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Table 5: Minimum wage effects on log wage differentials – model 1: regression
coefficients and significance levels (male sample)
10-50 30-50 70-50 90-50
(base) 2000 -0.267 *** -0.099 *** 0.097 *** 0.287 ***
1996 0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.007
1997 -0.008 -0.007 0.004 0.008
1998 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.000
1999 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.009
2001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
2002 0.016 0.002 -0.003 -0.003
2003 0.034 0.001 -0.003 -0.007
2004 0.035 0.005 -0.007 -0.013
2005 0.023 0.003 -0.009 -0.010
2006 0.024 0.004 -0.008 -0.011
NMW 0.128 _ 0.036 -0.081 * -0.207 _
NMW2ˆ -0.181 * -0.076 * 0.063 0.091
R2 33% 22% 27% 16%
Pooled OLS estimates. Flags: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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Table 6: Minimum wage effects on log wage differentials – model 2: regression
coefficients and significance levels (male sample)
10-50 90-50 10-50 90-50
(base) 2000 -61.879 *** 100.544 *** -46.734 ** 100.224 ***
1996 0.054 ** -0.093 ** 0.051 ** -0.082 **
1997 0.032 -0.067 * 0.024 -0.060 *
1998 0.038 _ -0.055 * 0.034 _ -0.048 _
1999 0.018 -0.026 0.017 -0.023
2001 -0.017 0.027 -0.018 0.024
2002 -0.019 0.064 * -0.016 0.057 *
2003 -0.011 0.081 ** -0.011 0.067 *
2004 -0.020 0.096 *** -0.020 0.083 **
2005 -0.044 * 0.121 *** -0.040 * 0.102 ***
2006 -0.052 * 0.139 *** -0.035 _ 0.116 ***
NMW 0.273 *** -0.452 *** 0.150 * -0.226 *
NMW2 -0.131 _ 0.040 -0.203 ** 0.079
SMW 12.221 *** -19.714 *** 9.195 ** -19.810 ***
SMW2 -0.604 *** 0.965 *** -0.448 ** 0.974 ***
Employment -0.007 _ 0.005
Turnover -0.050 * -0.002
Entrants -0.016 0.002
Small Comp. -0.054 _ -0.094 *
Large Comp. -0.014 -0.036
Agep30 0.007 0.006
Agep70 -0.014 *** 0.008 _
R2 55% 60% 61% 63%
Pooled OLS estimates. Flags: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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Table 7: Minimum wage effects on log wage differentials – model 1: regression
coefficients and significance levels (female sample)
10-50 30-50 70-50 90-50
(base) 2000 -0.173 *** -0.036 *** 0.057 *** 0.170 ***
1996 0.004 -0.009 0.004 0.001
1997 0.005 -0.011 0.005 0.004
1998 0.007 -0.002 0.002 -0.005
1999 0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.004
2001 0.011 -0.003 -0.001 0.001
2002 0.024 0.004 -0.004 -0.003
2003 0.042 * 0.008 -0.006 -0.011
2004 0.051 * 0.011 -0.010 -0.011
2005 0.049 * 0.009 -0.007 -0.007
2006 0.042 * 0.008 -0.008 -0.008
NMW 0.115 _ 0.136 *** -0.131 ** -0.269 **
NMW2 -0.303 *** -0.022 -0.031 -0.007
R2 50% 47% 17% 23%
Pooled OLS estimates. Flags: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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Table 8: Minimum wage effects on log wage differentials – model 2: regression
coefficients and significance levels (female sample)
10-50 90-50 10-50 90-50
(base) 2000 -59.832 *** 70.000 *** -44.329 ** 51.048 ***
1996 0.041 * -0.065 ** 0.037 * -0.062 **
1997 0.033 _ -0.045 * 0.022 -0.041 *
1998 0.027 -0.041 * 0.018 -0.039 *
1999 0.017 -0.020 0.010 -0.017
2001 0.001 0.020 -0.005 0.022
2002 0.002 0.040 * -0.005 0.041 *
2003 0.014 0.045 * -0.003 0.048 *
2004 0.016 0.059 ** -0.005 0.063 **
2005 0.009 0.077 *** -0.016 0.083 ***
2006 -0.004 0.088 *** -0.026 0.095 ***
NMW 0.267 *** -0.479 *** 0.349 *** -0.525 ***
NMW2 -0.200 ** -0.091 -0.089 -0.097
SMW 12.007 *** -13.777 *** 8.859 ** -9.872 **
SMW2 -0.603 *** 0.677 *** -0.446 ** 0.478 **
Employment -0.017 ** 0.015 **
Turnover -0.021 0.016
Entrants -0.039 * -0.016
Small Comp. -0.075 ** 0.100 ***
Large Comp. -0.130 *** 0.049 _
Agep30 0.013 ** -0.004
Agep70 0.000 -0.005
Women 0.000 0.000
R2 60% 60% 67% 66%
Pooled OLS estimates. Flags: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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Figure 3: Employment evolution by joint committe (1996-2006)
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Figure 4: Employment evolution by joint committe (1996-2006) - continued
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Figure 5: Employment evolution by joint committe (1996-2006) - continued
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Table 9: Description of the joint committees
Sector Label Type
109 clothing blue collar
110 textile cleaning blue collar
112 car maintenance blue collar
115 glass manufacturing blue collar
116 chemical manufacturing blue collar
118 food manufacturing blue collar
119 food distribution blue collar
120 textile manufacturing blue collar
121 cleaning blue collar
124 construction blue collar
126 carpenters blue collar
130 publishing blue collar
136 paper industry blue collar
140 transport & logistics blue collar
145 gardening blue collar
149 metal related industries blue collar
201 independent stores white collar
202 food trade white collar
207 chemical industry white collar
209 metal industry white collar
211 petrol industry white collar
214 textile industry white collar
215 clothing white collar
218 various service industries white collar
220 food industry white collar
302 accommodation mixed
306 insurances mixed
307 brokers mixed
308 savings bank mixed
310 banking mixed
311 large stores mixed
312 large stores mixed
313 pharmacies mixed
321 trade & distribution of drugs mixed
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